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"PARTNERSHIP BUSTER"* IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN 5
U.S.C. § 7106(a) AND (b)(1)
JAMES J. POWERS**

INTRODUCTION

Federal agencies and labor unions have long operated under collective bargaining laws that differ from private sector labor laws.'
Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act ("CSRA") of 1978, also
known as the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute
("FSLMRS"), outlines the rights and duties of both agencies and unions in the federal government. 2 A distinction exists in federal sector
labor relations between mandatory, prohibited, and permissive subjects of bargaining. The FSLMRS requires federal agencies to negotiate mandatory subjects with unions. These mandatory subjects
* FLRA, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, ADVICE MEMORANDUM No. 95-3, at 3
(Feb. 28, 1995), reprinted in FLRA, PuB. No. 95-2, FLRA NEWS (1995) [hereinafter FLRA
ADVICE] (using the term "partnership buster" to describe the uncertainty over the relationship
between 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a) and (b)(1)).
** J.D. Candidate, Chicago-Kent College of Law, 1998. I wish to thank Professor Marty
Malin for his insight and guidance on the development of this Note. I also wish to thank my
father for his encouragement and support. His thirty-year dedication to federal service
prompted my own interest in the issues affecting federal government "bureaucrats."
1. While as early as 1912 Congress recognized the right of federal employees to participate
in organizations striving to improve working conditions, see Lloyd-LaFollette Act, ch. 389, § 6,
37 Stat. 555 (1912), an official labor-management relations program for federal employees was
not established until 1962 with an Executive Order by President John Kennedy. Exec. Order No.
10,988, 3 C.F.R. 521 (1959-1963) (revoked by Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 191 (1969), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 7101, at 1028 (1994)); see also GAO, GOD-91-101, FEDERAL

LABOR RELATIONS A PROGRAM IN NEED OF REFORM 10 (1991).

Congress began regulating

private sector labor relations as early as 1926 with the passage of the Railway Labor Act, ch. 347,
44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1994)). In 1935, the National
Labor Relations Act provided the legal basis for collective bargaining for most private sector
employees. National Labor Relations Act, ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at
29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1994)). However, federal, state, and local governments, as well as agricultural workers, supervisors, and employees covered by the Railway Labor Act were exempted
from coverage. See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2)-(3).
2. 5 U.S.C. §§ 7101-7135 (1994). However, certain agencies in the federal government operate under still different laws. For example, private sector labor laws apply to exclusive representatives of postal employees. See 39 U.S.C. §§ 1201-1209 (1994). In addition, the FSLMRS
specifically excludes the General Accounting Office, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Central
Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, Tennessee Valley Authority, the Federal Labor
Relations Authority, the Federal Service Impasses Panel, and the Central Imagery Office. See 5
U.S.C. § 7103(a)(3). The President, through Executive Orders, can also exclude other agencies
or subdivisions of agencies whose primary function involves intelligence gathering or national
security work. See 5 U.S.C. § 7103(b)(1)(A).
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include general "conditions of employment."' 3 The FSLMRS specifically enumerates two categories of mandatory subjects: (1) procedures
which an agency observes in exercising its authority 4 and (2) appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by management's
exercise of authority.5 The FSLMRS prohibits federal agencies and
unions from negotiating subjects enumerated in 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a).
These prohibited subjects include an agency's budget, mission, internal security practices, personnel selections, assignment of work, use of
contract workers, and actions during emergencies. 6 In addition, the
FSLMRS permits agencies, at their election, to negotiate permissive
subjects of bargaining enumerated in § 7106(b)(1). These permissive
subjects include the methods and means of performing work and the
number of employees assigned to an organizational subdivision. 7
However, unions have no recourse if agencies decline to negotiate
these § 7106(b)(1) permissive subjects.
In October 1993, President Bill Clinton effectively abolished the
category of permissive subjects of bargaining in the federal sector.
Executive Order 12871 directed agency heads to negotiate
§ 7106(b)(1) subjects with their respective unions in new labor-management partnership committees. 8
Although the Executive Order forced agencies to negotiate
§ 7106(b)(1) subjects, agencies were provided little guidance on the
proper limits between these new "mandatory" subjects and the still
prohibited subjects of bargaining enumerated in § 7106(a). The Federal Labor Relations Authority ("FLRA"), the federal agency entrusted with overseeing federal labor-management relations, 9 had
encountered few opportunities prior to Executive Order 12871 to rule
on the proper relationship between § 7106(a) and (b)(1).lo In most
cases prior to Executive Order 12871, an agency always could rely on
3. The FSLMRS grants federal employees the right to "engage in collective bargaining
with respect to conditions of employment through representatives." 5 U.S.C. § 7102(2). "Conditions of employment" generally include personnel policies and practices affecting working conditions. 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(14).
4. See 5 U.S.C.§ 7106(b)(2).
5. See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3).
6. See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a).
7. See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1).
8. See Exec. Order No. 12,871, 3 C.F.R. 655, 657 (1994) [hereinafter Order 12,871], reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7101 at 1033, 1034.
9. The FLRA replaced the Federal Labor Relations Council, see infra note 50, as an independent body responsible for enforcing the provisions of the FSLMRS. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 71047105 for a description of the structure and duties of the FLRA.
10. See BARRY E. SHAPiRo & CHMSTOPHER EVANS, FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS 1995
DESK BOOK at 1-8 (1994).

1997]

PARTNERSHIP BUSTER IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

its discretion not to negotiate a § 7106(b)(1) permissive subject of bargaining instead of arguing that the subject also infringed on a
§ 7106(a) reserved right."
In 1994, the U. S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit limited the scope of § 7106(a) reserved rights by holding that
§ 7106(b)(1) permissive subjects of bargaining are negotiable, despite
any infringement on § 7106(a) reserved rights. In Association of Civilian Technicians,Montana Air ChapterNo. 29 v. FLRA, 12 ("ACT"), the
court barred an agency head from subsequently refusing to approve
an already negotiated § 7106(b)(1) subject regardless of its conflict
with a § 7106(a) reserved right. 13 According to the court, Congress
intended to make § 7106(b)(1) subjects exceptions to § 7106(a) reserved rights.' 4 The FLRA subsequently adopted the court's interpretation of the relationship between § 7106(a) and (b)(1). 15
This Note will analyze the FSLMRS to determine the proper relationship between prohibited and permissive subjects of bargaining
found in the federal sector. Part I will describe the differences between private and federal sector labor relations, the legislative history
of the FSLMRS, and case law interpreting the proper relationship between § 7106(a) and (b). Part II will describe Executive Order 12871
and its impact on future agency-union negotiations concerning
§ 7106(b)(1) subjects. Part III will present the decision of the ACT
court on the relationship between § 7106(a) and (b)(1). Part IV will
evaluate the court's reasoning in light of the legislative history of the
FSLMRS and prior case law. Finally, Part V will suggest a proper
relationship between § 7106(a) and (b)(1).
I.

A.

INTRODUCTION TO THE

FSLMRS

Federal Versus Private Sector Labor Relations

Although the FSLMRS contains some similarities to private sector labor laws,' 6 federal sector unions possess vastly inferior bargain11. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
12. 22 F.3d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
13. See id. at 1155-56.

14. See id.
15. See National Ass'n Gov't Employees, Local R5-184, 51 F.L.R.A. 386, 392 (1995).
16. See GAO, supra note 1, at 14. The FSLMRS provided for the creation of the FLRA, an
independent agency to issue policy decisions and adjudicate labor disputes in the federal sector,
similar to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). Compare 5 U.S.C. § 7104(a)-(b) (estab-

lishing a three-member board appointed by the President) with 29 U.S.C. § 153(a) (establishing a
five-member board appointed by the President). The FLRA, like the NLRB, also has a General
Counsel who is entrusted with the investigation of unfair labor practice charges and the prosecu-

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:837

ing power when compared to their private sector counterparts. Since
the passage of the National Labor Relations Act, 17 private sector unions have enjoyed the power to require an employer to negotiate a
broad range of subjects. In the private sector, management and unions must bargain in good faith on "wages, hours, and other terms and
conditions of employment.118 Based on the preceding directive, subjects of negotiation can be divided into three categories: mandatory,
permissive, and prohibited. Mandatory subjects of bargaining in the
private sector normally include "layoffs and recalls, sick leave, incentive pay, paid holidays, vacation schedules, hours of work, work rules
relating to shifts of work and such fringe benefits as cost-of-living adjustments and profit-sharing plans."' 19
An employer's obligation to bargain is limited by only those subjects designated by the courts as permissive or by Congress as illegal.
A party is not obligated to bargain over permissive subjects but may
choose to do so. 2 0 A party commits an unfair labor practice if it insists

on a permissive subject of bargaining to the point of impasse. 21 A
mandatory subject of bargaining must have a "'direct, significant relationship to ...terms or conditions of employment,' rather than a 're-

mote or incidental relationship." '22 Courts generally have defined
"terms and conditions of employment" broadly so that few subjects
tion of complaints. Compare 5 U.S.C. § 7104(f)(2)(B) (establishing a General Counsel), with 29

U.S.C. § 153(d) (establishing a General Counsel).
The method for resolving unfair labor charges was intended to be analogous to the private
sector as well. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1403, at 50 (1978), reprinted in SUBCOMM. ON POSTAL
PERSONNEL AND MODERNIZATION OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON POST OFFICE AND CIVIL SERV.,
96TH CONO., LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TIE FEDERAL SERVICE LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELA.

TIONS STATUTE, TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL SERVICE REFORM ACT OF 1978, at 675, 696 (Comm.

Print 1979) [hereinafter LEOISLATIVE HISTORY]. Compare 5 U.S.C. §§ 7116, 7118 (outlining unfair labor practices for both a union and agency and the General Counsel's review of unfair labor
practice complaints), with 29 U.S.C. §§ 158, 160 (outlining unfair labor practices by both an
employer and union and the responsibilities of the General Counsel to prevent unfair labor
practices).
17. Ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169).
18. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
19. WILLIAM B. GOULD IV, A PRIMER ON AMERICAN LABOR LAW 107 (3d ed. 1993) (foot-

note omitted); see, e.g., NLRB v. Black-Clawson Co., 210 F.2d 523 (6th Cir. 1954) (per curiam)
(affirming profit-sharing plans are mandatory subjects); Medicenter, Mid-South Hosp., 221
NLRB Dec. (CCH) 670 (1975) (holding the adoption of mandatory polygraph examinations is a
mandatory subject); Standard Candy Co., 147 NLRB Dec. (CCH) 1070 (1964) (holding changes
in wage scales are mandatory subjects); In re National Grinding Wheel Co., 75 NLRB Dec.
(CCH) 905 (1948) (holding that elimination of rest and lunch periods is a mandatory subject).
20. See GOULD, supra note 19, at 106.
21. See id.
22. NLRB v. Salvation Army of Mass. Dorchester Day Care Center, 763 F.2d 1, 7 (1st Cir.
1985) (quoting NLRB v. Massachusetts Nurses Ass'n, 557 F.2d 894, 898 (1st Cir. 1977)), quoted
in GOULD, supra note 19, at 107.
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are declared permissive. 23 Management and unions are also restricted
from bargaining illegal subjects such as discriminatory practices based
26
25
on race, religion, and gender,24 hot cargo clauses, and closed shops.
In the federal sector, the range of mandatory subjects of collective bargaining is much more limited than in the private sector. Federal sector prohibited and permissive subjects outnumber private
sector prohibited and permissive subjects of bargaining. Although
federal sector unions enjoy the right to bargain about "conditions of
employment, '27 the FSLMRS includes several exceptions that se28
verely restrict the range of negotiable subjects.
First, even if a union proposal concerns a condition of employment, a federal agency is prohibited from negotiating with the union if
bargaining in good faith is "inconsistent with any Federal law or any
Government-wide rule or regulation. '29 Beyond this consistency requirement, a union still may not automatically bargain over subjects of
agency rules and regulations unless the FLRA has found that "no
compelling need ... exists for the rule or regulation. '30 Second, the
FSLMRS reserves a list of enumerated rights that federal agencies
may not bargain away to unions. This list includes an agency's mission, budget, and personnel selections. 31 Third, the FSLMRS outlines
23. However, courts have had difficulty differentiating between mandatory and permissive
subjects of bargaining. See GOULD, supra note 19, at 110-15; cf. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v.
NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 686 (1981) (ceasing business operations is a permissive subject of bargaining); Fiberboard Paper Prod. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 215 (1964) (contracting out work
formerly performed by employees is a mandatory subject of bargaining); NLRB v. Borg-Warner
Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349-50 (1958) (proposing procedures regulating internal union votes is a
permissive subject).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1994).
25. Hot cargo clauses exempt employees from handling goods bound for an employer that
is blacklisted by a union. The employer, in effect, agrees not to do business with another employer that the union targets. See GouLD, supra note 19, at 52. Such clauses are void and
unenforceable with certain exceptions for the construction and garment industries. See 29
U.S.C. § 158(e).
26. A closed shop agreement requires an employer to only hire union members and discharge those employees who lose union membership. See MARK A. RoTHSTEIN & LANCE LIEBMAN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EMPLOYMENT LAW 50 (3d ed. 1994). Closed shops are now

illegal because an employer must allow an employee a thirty-day grace period before requiring
the payment of union dues. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), (b)(2).
27. 5 U.S.C. § 7102(2). "'Conditions of employment' means personnel policies, practices,
and matters, whether established by rule, regulation, or otherwise, affecting working conditions
....
" 5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(14).
28. See Department of Defense v. FLRA, 685 F.2d 641, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
29. 5 U.S.C. § 7117(a)(1).
30. 5 U.S.C. § 7117(a)(2).
31. Section 7106(a) states in part:
Nothing in this chapter shall affect the authority of any management official of any
agency(1) to determine the mission, budget, organization, number of employees, and
internal security practices of the agency; and
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a separate category of subjects that federal agencies may negotiate at
their discretion.32 These permissive subjects include "the numbers,
types, and grades of employees or positions assigned to any organizational subdivision, work project, or tour of duty, or... the technology,
methods, and means of performing work."'33
The only clearly defined subjects that federal agencies and unions
must negotiate are the "procedures which management ... will observe in exercising any authority under this section" and "appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exercise of
any authority under this section. ' 35 However, even these two
mandatory subjects must pass the consistency and compelling need
tests for compliance with existing federal laws and regulations. 36
The comparatively weak bargaining position of federal sector unions is highlighted by their inability to call for strikes and work actions. 37 Although Congress has long protected the right to withhold
labor for private sector employees, 38 Congress has also recognized the
(2) in accordance with applicable laws(A) to hire, assign, direct, layoff, and retain employees in the agency,
or to suspend, remove, reduce in grade or pay, or take other disciplinary action against such employees;
(B) to assign work, to make determinations with respect to contracting out, and to determine the personnel by which agency operations shall be conducted;
(C) with respect to filling positions, to make selections for appointments from(i) among properly ranked and certified candidates for promotion; or
(ii) any other appropriate source; and
(D) to take whatever actions may be necessary to carry out the
agency mission during emergencies.
5 U.S.C. § 7106(a).
32. See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1).
33. Id.
34. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(2).
35. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3).
36. "Section 7106(b)(3) does not make negotiable a matter which is inconsistent with law
other than the Statute." American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Dep't of Educ. Council of AFGE
Locals, 38 F.L.R.A. 1068, 1083 (1990).
37. Cf. GAO, supra note 1, at 14 (citing the prohibition of traditional bargaining incentives
like strikes as a major difference between labor relations in the federal and private sector);
GouLD, supra note 19, at 179 ("The most difficult public-sector issue in the United States relates
to whether public employees should have the right to strike."); SAR A. LEVITAN & ALEXANDRA
B. NODEN, WORKING FOR THE SOVEREIGN: EMPLOYEE RELATIONS IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 41-42 (1983) (analyzing traditional arguments against federal employees' right to strike);
MICHAEL YATES, LABOR LAW HANDBOOK 48 (1987) (describing the serious penalties that face
federal employees who strike).
38. In 1914, Congress denied employers the use of the federal court system to prevent
union work stoppages. The Clayton Act generally prevented federal courts from issuing injunctions in labor disputes "concerning terms or conditions of employment." Clayton Act, ch. 323,
§ 20, 38 Stat. 730, 738 (1914) (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 52).
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inconsistency between work stoppages and an effective public sector.39
The FSLMRS precludes strikes as an option for federal unions to use
against management, 4 and Congress even has provided criminal penalties for those federal employees found guilty of striking.41
In addition to their inability to strike, federal sector unions may
not bargain for union or agency shops.4 2 The FSLMRS guarantees
federal employees the right to "refrain from [joining a labor organization], freely and without fear of penalty or reprisal, and each employee shall be protected in the exercise of such right. '43
B. Legislative History of the FSLMRS
"Bureaucrats. If you're not one of them, you probably can't
stand them. You figure that they're lazy and overpaid, that they arrive
at work late, leave early and take long lunch hours. But you can't do
anything about it, because it's impossible to fire a bureaucrat." 44 This
common viewpoint provided the backdrop for civil service reform in
1978. 45 President Jimmy Carter proposed legislation in 1978 with the
39. The most common arguments against public sector strikes include the protection of public safety, state sovereignty, and democratic processes. See LEvrrAN & NODEN, supra note 37, at
41-42.
40. The FSLMRS specifies that it is an unfair labor practice for a union to "call, or participate in, a strike, work stoppage, or slowdown." 5 U.S.C. § 7116(b)(7)(A). In addition, a union
commits an unfair labor practice by "failing to take action to prevent or stop such activity." 5
U.S.C. § 7116(b)(7)(B). Although a striking union is, by definition, not a labor organization, see
5 U.S.C. § 7103(a)(4)(D), the FLRA has discretion to either revoke the exclusive recognition
status of a striking union or "take any other appropriate disciplinary action." 5 U.S.C.
§ 7120(f)(1)-(2); see Professional Air Traffic Controllers Org. v. FLRA, 685 F.2d 547, 578-84
(D.C. Cir. 1982).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 1918 (1994) (providing for up to a $1,000 fine and a year imprisonment).
42. Union shops (workplaces where employees are required to become a member of the
union after the 30-day grace period by paying union membership dues, see RoT-MIN & LianMAN, supra note 26, at 51) are allowed in private industry except in those states with "right to
work" statutes. See 29 U.S.C. § 164(b). Agency shops are workplaces where union membership
is not required, but all employees are required to pay fees comparable to union dues for purposes of union administration and contract negotiation. See RonsTE'In & LIEBMAN, supra note
26, at 51.
43. 5 U.S.C. § 7102. For arguments against the prohibition of the union shop in the federal
government, see LEvrAN & NODEN, supra note 37, at 16-18 (attributing lagging union member-

ship in the federal government to the preclusion of union shop agreements); Marick F. Masters
& Robert S. Atkin, Financialand BargainingImplicationsof Free Riding in the FederalSector, 22
J. COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS PuB. SECOR 327, 332 (1993) (changing policies to encourage

union membership might significantly increase the unions' capacity to bargain).
44. Bureaucrats Under Fire, 10 NAT'L J. Sep. 30, 1978, at 1540.
45. See Bureaucratson Notice: Shape Up or Else!, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Oct. 23, 1978,

at 36 (quoting President Carter's view that the American people view bureaucrats as "underworked, overpaid"); Robert R. Dince, Coping with the Civil Service, FORT NE, June 5, 1978,
at 132 (describing personal frustrations with civil service system). However, in a bid to gain
public support for civil service reform, President Carter himself partly contributed to the public's
low esteem of federal workers by stressing stereotypical bureaucratic inefficiency. See, e.g., Patricia W. Ingraham, The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978: The Design and Legislative History, in
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intent to "increase the government's efficiency by placing new emphasis on the quality of performance of Federal workers. ' 46 President
Carter initially did not emphasize revamping the federal government's
labor-management relations system. Rather, President Carter
stressed abolishing the U.S. Civil Service Commission, establishing a
Senior Executive Service, providing incentive pay for federal manag47
ers, and easing the restrictions on discharging federal employees.
However, as the civil service reform bills progressed through Congress, the Carter Administration soon found it necessary to include
from orlabor relations reform as a way to placate strong opposition
48
ganized labor and other employee interest groups.
To a large extent, President Carter's proposal merely would have
codified the language of Executive Order 11491. 49 Executive Order
11491, as interpreted by the Federal Labor Relations Council, 50 provided for mandatory, permissive, and prohibited subjects of bargaining like the private sector. Mandatory subjects of bargaining included
"personnel policies and practices and matters affecting working conditions."'51 Mandatory subjects consisted of the alleviation of adverse
impacts on employees and procedures concerning the exercise of management's rights. 52 However, like the FSLMRS, management retained many rights on which it was either prohibited to negotiate or
permitted to negotiate at its discretion. Prohibited subjects included
an agency's right to direct, hire, promote, and discharge employees; to
maintain efficient operations; and to determine methods and means
LEGISLATING BUREAUCRATIC CHANGE 13, 21 (Patricia W. Ingraham & Carolyn Ban eds., State

Univ. of New York Press 1984).
46. See H.R. Doc. No. 95-299, at 1 (1978), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note
16, at 623.
47. See id. at 2-3, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 624-25.
48. See Ingraham, supra note 45, at 20.
49. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-1403, at 12 (1978), reprintedin LEoISLATIVE HISTORY, supra
note 16, at 682 (acknowledging Carter's proposal would have merely codified the Executive
Order labor relations system); 124 CONO. REc. 25,613 (1978) (statement by Rep. Clay); id. at
13,733 (reprinting letter from Civil Service Chairman, Alan K. Campbell).
50. Executive Order 11491 established the Federal Labor Relations Council to administer
and interpret the Executive Order labor relations system. Exec. Order No. 11491, 3 C.F.R. 191,
194 (1969) [hereinafter Order 11,491], reprintedas amended in 5 U.S.C. § 7101, at 1029 (1978).
The Council was composed of the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, the Secretary of
Labor, and another Executive Branch official. See id. at 194, reprintedas amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 7101 app. at 1029. However, Order 11491 did not provide for judicial review of the Council's
decisions.
51. Order 11,491, supra note 50, at 198, reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 7101 app. at
1031.

52. See LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS TASK FORCE, FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT PROJECT, OPTION PAPER NUMBER FOUR (1977) [hereinafter PERSONNEL PROJECT], reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 1393.
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for conducting operations.5 3 Permissive subjects included an agency's
mission; budget; organization; number of total employees; and the
numbers, types, and grades of employees assigned to an organiza54
tional unit.
The Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs produced a bill
reflecting President Carter's wishes. The Senate Committee Report
accompanying the bill confirmed that the "policies and approaches of
Executive Order 11491 ... have provided a sound and balanced basis
for cooperative and constructive relationships between labor organizations and management officials.... [T]hese measures will promote
effective labor-management relationships in Federal operations. '55
The version that eventually passed the floor vote in the Senate retained the language of the Executive Order. 56
However, in the House of Representatives, passage of the President's civil service reform encountered difficulty. 57 The House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service proved to be "a stronghold for
allies of federal employee unions and bureaucratic interests who opposed the management-oriented bill."'58 The bill reported to the
House floor completely discarded Carter's proposed Title VII labormanagement section. 59
The bill reported to the full House contained the first semblance
of the current § 7106(b) language-an explicit requirement to negotiate procedures management would use in exercising its authority
under § 7106(a) and appropriate arrangements for employees adversely affected by management's exercise of authority.60 Section
7106(a) eliminated several reserved rights protected under the Execu53. See Order 11,491, supra note 50, at 199-200, reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 7101
app. at 1031.
54. See id. at 199, reprintedas amended in 5 U.S.C. § 7101 app. at 1031. For a review of the

classification of subjects of bargaining under the Executive Order System and proposed reform

options in 1977, see PERSONNEL PRoJECt, supra note 52, reprinted in LEGIsLATNVE HISTORY,
supra note 16, at 1391-98.
55. See S. REP. No. 95-969, at 12 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2734.

56. See id., at 109, reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2831 (the Senate generally retained

the reserved rights of Executive Order 11,491).

Compare S. 2640, 95th Cong. § 7218(a)(2)

(1978), reprintedin LEGISLATivE HISTORY, supranote 16, at 589-90 (generally retaining management rights language of Executive Order 11,491), with Order 11,491, supra note 50, at 199, reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 7101 app. at 1031 (listing management's reserved rights).
57. See Ingraham, supra note 45, at 23.
58. Kathy Sawyer, Carter's Civil Service Victory Confounds Capital's Cynics, WASH. POST,
Oct. 14, 1978, at A2.
59. The House Committee on Post Office and Civil Service had deleted completely all lan-

guage after the enacting clause. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1403, at 1 (1978), reprintedin LEoISLA-

TivE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 677.
60. See H.R. 11,280, 95th Cong. § 7106(b) (1978), reprintedin LEOISLATiVE HISTORY, supra
note 16, at 391-92.
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job classification,
tive Order such as determining promotion policy,
61
and reduction-in-force standards and procedures.
The committee intended "to achieve a broadening of the scope of
collective bargaining to an extent greater than the scope.., under the
Executive Order. ' 62 However, the committee simultaneously wanted
to "preserve the essential prerogatives and flexibility Federal managers must have."' 63 In supplemental views to the Committee Report,
several representatives tried to allay fears that the collective bargaining rights of federal employees had been expanded significantly. 64 In
particular, the representatives cited the absence in the bill of the right
to strike, the right to bargain collectively over pay and fringe benefits,
65
and the right to negotiate an agency shop.
Once on the House floor, members of Congress debated H.R.
67
11280 and offered numerous amendments. 66 Representative Ford,
surprised by the "rhetoric and hysteria" about Title VII, emphasized
that the bill was not a radical departure from the Executive Orders
but simply a small increase in union bargaining powers. 68 An amendment that would have replaced the entirety of the House Committee's
version of Title VII with the language of Executive Order 11491 failed
to reach a vote. 69
The House finally overwhelmingly passed Representative Udall's
substitute amendment for Title VII.70 This amendment contained the
current prefatory language of § 7106(a) "[s]ubject to subsection (b) of
61. Compare H.R. 11,280, § 7106(a)(2), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16,
at 391 (prohibiting negotiations on an agency's mission, budget, organization, number of employees, internal security practices; and retaining the right to direct employees and take actions
during national emergencies) with Order 11,491, supra note 50, at 199, reprintedas amended in 5
U.S.C. § 7101, app. at 1031 (additionally prohibiting negotiations over hiring, promoting, transferring, assigning, retaining, suspending, demoting, and discharging employees).
62. H.R. REP. No. 95-1403, at 43, reprinted in LEGISLATiVE HISTORY, supra note 16, app. at
689.
63. Id. at 43-44, reprinted in LEGISLATIvE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 689-90.
64. Id. at 377, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 721.
65. Id. at 377, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note 16, at 721.
66. E.g. 124 CONG. REC. 29,190 (1978) (describing amendments to substitute amendments
of H.R. 11,280).
67. Representative Udall, the sponsor of the Amendment that eventually became the accepted version of the FSLMRS, lauded Representative Ford's "key, critical role" in forging the
compromise for labor relations reform. See id. at 29,197.
68. Id. at 25,721.
69. Representative Collins introduced an amendment to H.R. 11280 that would have replaced Title VII with the Senate's version, reflecting the Carter Administration's preference for
the codified Executive Order system. See id. at 29,167, 29,185. However, it was agreed that
Representative Udall's substitute for the Collins Amendment would be voted on instead. See id.
at 29,202.
70. The substitute amendment passed with 381 Ayes and 0 Noes. See id.
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this section .... "- Under § 7106(a), management recovered some of
the reserved rights that the House Committee on Post Office and Civil
Service had discarded. 72 The permissive bargaining subjects under
§ 7106(b)(1) made their first appearance in this amendment. 73 Representative Ford explained that the inclusion of permissive subjects of
bargaining under § 7106(b)(1) "has no substantive effect on the status
quo. In fact, we are picking up the language of the management rights
clause, as it is referred to in the Executive order, by tailoring it to fit
the structure of this bill. .. ."74 The right to bargain over procedures
and appropriate arrangements was retained as § 7106(b)(2) and (3).75
Representative Clay stressed that although more management rights
had been added under § 7106(a), nothing "preclude[s] negotiations
over procedures or adverse effects involved in those rights. ' '76 In addition, Representative Udall's sectional analysis of § 7106(b)(1) indicated that nothing in the management rights clause should prevent an
agency at its discretion from negotiating with a union the methods and
means of doing work or the numbers of employees assigned to an organizational subdivision. 77 In conference committee, the House ver78
sion of § 7106 of the FSLMRS eventually won approval.
TWo points from the preceding history should be stressed, First,
much of the legislative history indicates the FSLMRS was not intended to expand significantly union bargaining rights beyond the Executive Order system. President Carter and the Senate desired merely
to codify Executive Order 11491. 79 While the House Committee on
Post Office and Civil Service initially removed several management
reserved rights that had existed under the Executive Orders, the final
version of the FSLMRS contained even more prohibited subjects of
71. Id. at 29,176. See id. at 29,174 to 29,182 for the entire text of Representative Udall's
Substitute Amendment.
72. Compare H.R. 11,280, 95th Cong. § 7106(a) (1978), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 16, at 372, 391 (reserving 10 management rights), with 124 CONG. REC. 29,183 (1978)
(adding 9 more reserved rights including hiring, assigning, directing, layoff, retaining, suspending, and removing employees; reducing an employee's grade or pay; and making personnel
selections from ranked candidates).
73. See 124 CONG. REC. 29,183 (1978).
74. Id. at 29,195.
75. See id. at 29,183.
76. Id. at 29,187.
77. See id. at 29,183.
78. In the several reported discrepancies between the House and Senate versions of the
management rights section, the Senate receded. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1717, at 153-54 (1978),
reprintedin 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2887-88.
79. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1403, at 12 (1978), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supranote
16, at 675, 682; S. REP. No. 95-969, at 12 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2734.
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bargaining than originally existed under the Executive Orders.80 Alan
Campbell, a former Chairman of the U.S. Civil Service Commission
and Director of the U.S. Office of Personnel Management, 8 ' criticized
the use of "peripheral legislative history and ambiguous statements to
...misread the essential legislative intent to codify Executive Order
11491."82 Thus, any legislative analysis of § 7106(a) and (b) must consider the fact that the FSLMRS maintained the limited scope of bargaining for federal sector unions.
Second, three selections from the legislative history indicate that
the items contained in § 7106(b) were intended to be a narrow and
separate category of subjects compared to the management rights contained in § 7106(a). In explaining the differences between the House
and Senate versions of the management rights clause, the Conference
Committee Report stated that "[b]oth bills specified certain matters
on which the parties may not negotiate under any circumstances and
certain other matters on which the agency, may, in its discretion, negotiate."8 3 The use of the words "other matters" 84 indicates Congress
envisioned § 7106(b)(1) subjects as items separate and different from
§ 7106(a) reserved rights.
The Conference Committee Report then proceeded to describe
limitations on an agency's ability to negotiate § 7106(b)(1) subjects
with a union. While describing that § 7106(b)(1) grants a federal
agency the discretion to bargain about the methods and means of performing work, the Report further stressed that certain subjects like an
agency's general policy decisions were not intended to fall under the
definition of methods and means.8 5 To provide the public with "as
effective and efficient a Government as possible," Congress did not
intend:
80. Under the Executive Order labor relations system, an agency's mission, budget, organization, number of employees, and internal security practices were all permissive subjects of bargaining. See PERSONNEL PROJECr, supra note 52, reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra note

16, at 1391, 1396-97. However, all these rights were included in the FSLMRS as prohibited
subjects of bargaining. See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(1)(1994).
81. Campbell contributed to the passage of the civil service reform package by unifying
support from a broad "spectrum of groups" including organized labor. Sawyer, supra note 58, at
A2.
Labor-ManagementRelations Under CSRA: Provisionsand Ef82. Donald F. Parker et al.,

fects, in LEGISLATING BUREAUCRATIC CHANGE 161, 163 (Patricia W. Ingraham & Carolyn Ban
eds., 1984) (quoting a letter from Alan K. Campbell to the GAO in 1980).

83. H.R. REP. No. 95-1717, at 153, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2887 (emphasis
added).

84. Id.
85. See iL H.R. REP. No. 95-1717, at 154, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2887.
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[t]he phrase "methods and means"

. . . to authorize IRS to negotiate
with a labor organization over how returns should be selected for
audit, or how thorough the audit of the returns should be. It does
not subject to the collective bargaining agreement the judgment of
EPA about
how to select recipients for the award of environmental
86
grants.
The above selection indicates that a § 7106(b)(1) subject-methods and means of performing work-was not intended simultaneously
to incorporate an agency's right to set broad policies in order to accomplish its stated mission. Thus, negotiations over an agency's entire
mission and budget 87 are by definition different than negotiations over
the numbers, types, and grades of employees assigned to an organizational subdivision or the methods and means of performing work.8
Finally, after the passage of the CSRA of 1978, Representative
Ford further explained the intended relationship of § 7106(a) and (b):
By the clear language of the bill itself, any exercise of the enumerated management rights is conditioned upon the full negotiation of
arrangements regarding adverse effects and procedures. As is made
clear by the absence of the phrase "at the election of the agency,"
procedures and arrangements are mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining. Only after this'obligation has been completely fulfilled
is an agency allowed to assert that a retained management right bars
negotiations over a particular proposal....
...If for example, an agency initially contemplates transferring
10 employees into quarters suitable for only half that number, an
"appropriate arrangement" cannot be negotiated without changing
(at least somewhat) the number of employees to be relocated.... In
the example cited, the agency enjoys a retained management right
to transfer all 10 employees only
after procedures and appropriate
89
arrangements are agreed upon.
Representative Ford utilized the word "conditioned" to describe
the relationship between § 7106(a) and (b). 90 "Conditioned" implies
that § 7106(a) rights exist independent of § 7106(b) subjects of bargaining and will not be forfeited if in direct conflict with § 7106(b). 9 1
To enjoy its reserve right, management first must fulfill its obligation
86. Id.
87. See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(1)(1994).

88. See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1).
89. 124 CONG. REc. 38,715 (1978)(emphasis added).

90. Id.
91. "Conditioned" or "conditional" means "[t]hat which is dependent upon or granted subject to a condition." BLACK'S LAW DICrnONARY 294 (6th ed. 1990). A condition is "[a] future
and uncertain event upon the happening of which is made to depend the existence of an obligation." Id. at 293. Applying these definitions to the present context, the agency's bargaining over

§ 7106(b) matters is the future and uncertain event. An agency's right not to bargain on
§ 7106(a) matters depends on whether the agency initially fulfills its obligation to bargain
§ 7106(b) subjects.
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to negotiate procedures and appropriate arrangements with a union. 92
This conditional relationship suggests § 7106(b) contains a conceptually separate category of subjects requiring negotiations before
§ 7106(a) rights come into play.
In his hypothetical, Representative Ford implied that an agency
may be forced through negotiations with the union to either construct
an addition to the quarters to accommodate the extra five individuals
or set up a rotation schedule so no more than five individuals work
simultaneously in the quarters. However, the agency would always
retain a broad policy right, which it could not negotiate away to the
union, to transfer the ten employees. Based on this analysis, appropriate arrangements and procedures are conceptually separate and narrow subjects when compared to broad reserved rights.
C. Judicial Interpretation of § 7106(a) and (b)(1)
After the passage of the FSLMRS, the FLRA and federal courts
did not explore the relationship between § 7106(b)(1) permissive subjects and § 7106(a) prohibited subjects. The question of whether a
union proposal properly consisted of a prohibited or permissive subject was largely irrelevant due to an agency's perpetual ability to use
its discretion under § 7106(b)(1) to refuse to negotiate the subject.93

However, the FLRA and federal courts extensively developed the relationship between § 7106(a) and § 7106(b)(2) and (b)(3). 94 In particular, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit provided many interpretations of the relationship between
these two sections. 95 As will be shown, the court reflected the legislative intent described in the last section by acknowledging that
§ 7106(a) and (b)(2) are mutually exclusive, and that procedures and
appropriate arrangements are ultimately limited by § 7106(a) reserved
rights.
The FLRA had limited opportunities to rule on the direct relationship between § 7106(a) and (b)(1) in the years following the pas92. See 124 CONG. REC. 38,715 (1978).
93. See SHAPIRO & EVANS, supra note 10, at 1-8; see also FLRA, OFFICE OF THE GENERAL
COUNSEL, REFERRAL OF A MAJOR POLICY ISSUE FOR A GENERAL RULING 7 (Feb. 28, 1995),
reprinted in FLRA, PUB. No. 95-2 FLRA NEWS (1995) [hereinafter FLRA REFERRAL].
94. For a historical and current analysis of the FLRA's treatment of procedures and appropriate arrangements, see generally PETER BROIDA, A GUIDE TO FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS
AUTHORITY LAW & PRACTICE 434-63 (1994).

95. Cf. American Fed'n Gov't Employees, Local 2782 v. FLRA, 702 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (recognizing the negotiability of an arrangement unless it is inappropriate due to excessive
interference with a reserved right); Department of Defense, Army-Air Force Exch. Serv. v.
FLRA, 659 F.2d 1140 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (approving the FLRA's "acting at all" test).
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sage of the FSLMRS. Except for unique situations like those found in
ACT, 96 the FLRA had no need to decide whether a union proposal
constituted a § 7106(a) reserved right or a § 7106(b)(1) permissive
subject since both subsections would render the union proposal nonnegotiable. 97 Before Executive Order 12871's mandate to agencies to
negotiate permissive subjects, agencies could consider a union proposal dealing with a permissive subject, confer with the union about it,
and still withdraw from consideration of the union proposal prior to
98
any final agreement.
Most § 7106(b)(1) litigation involved the identification of a permissive subject rather than distinguishing between a permissive and
prohibited subject of bargaining. 99 Subsequently, the FLRA issued
numerous decisions defining the "numbers, types, and grades of employees . . . assigned to [an] organizational subdivision," and the

"methods, and means of performing work."100
For example, the FLRA defined means as "any instrumentality,
including an agent, tool, device, measure, plan or policy used by an
agency for the accomplishing or furthering of the performance of its
work."' 0 ' The FLRA defined method as "the way in which an agency
performs its work."' 0 2 The FLRA also developed a test for identifying when a union proposal dealt with a method and means of performing work. 10 3
96. In ACT, the agency at the bargaining unit level had agreed already to negotiate a union
proposal concerning a permissive subject of bargaining. Association of Civilian Technicians,
Mont. Air Ct. No. 29 v. FLRA, 22 F.3d 1150, 1152 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Only after the union and
agency at the local level had agreed to the proposal did the agency head decide not to honor the
agreement. See id. However, the agency at the local level always had the opportunity initially to
refuse to negotiate the permissive subject.
97. See FLRA REFERRAL, supra note 93, at 7.
98. Representative Ford indicated an agency was "under no obligation to bargain [a permissive subject], but in fact they can start bargaining and change their minds and decide they do not
want to talk about it any more, and pull it off the table." 124 CONG. REc. 29,195 (1978); see
American Fed'n Gov't Employees, Nat'l Immigration & Naturalization Serv. Council, 8
F.L.R.A. 347, 381-82 (1982).
99. Cf.American Fed'n Gov't Employees, Local 1923, 44 F.L.R.A. 1405, 1530-34 (1992)
(considering, in turn, whether a union proposal was a § 7106(b)(1) permissive or a § 7106(a)
prohibited subject, but not distinguishing between the categories); American Fed'n Gov't Employees, Nat'l Council VA Locals, 29 F.L.R.A. 515, 543-45 (1987) (considering, in turn, whether
a union proposal calling for adequate staff levels was a § 7106(b)(1) permissive or a § 7106(a)
prohibited subject, but not distinguishing between the categories).
100. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1)(1994).
101. American Fed'n State, County & Mun. Employees, Local 2910, 19 F.L.R.A. 1180, 1181
(1985).
102. Id. The FLRA has defined performing work as including "those matters which directly
and integrally relate to the agency's operations as a whole." Id.
103. The FLRA first examines whether there is a "direct relationship" between the agency's
method or means and the accomplishment of the agency's mission. American Fed'n Gov't Employees, Local 1923, 44 F.L.R.A. at 1531. If so, then the FLRA determines whether the union's
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Unlike § 7106(b)(1), the FLRA and the courts extensively ruled
on the proper relationship between § 7106(b)(2) and § 7106(a). Section 7106(b)(2) requires an agency to negotiate the procedures it will
observe when exercising its authority under § 7106.104 The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit early recognized the FSLMRS's establishment of a "hierarchy, in which the
terms of subsection (b) hold priority over those of subsection (a)." 105
However, the court also recognized the mutual exclusivity between
§ 7106(a) reserved rights and § 7106(b)(2) procedures. A union proposal that directly interfered with a § 7106(a) reserved right was by
definition not a procedure. 1°6 Thus, in order to determine the negotiability of a union proposal, the FLRA currently defines whether the
proposal is truly a procedure or whether it is something other than a
procedure due to its interference with a § 7106(a) substantive right.
The FLRA now utilizes two tests to determine whether a union
proposal deals with a mandatory negotiable procedure under
§ 7106(b)(2) or a management reserved right under § 7106(a). 10 7 If
the union proposal concerns a "pure procedure," the proposal is negotiable as long as it does not "prevent the agency from 'acting at
all.'" 108 However, if the union proposal contains some aspects of both
procedure and substance, the FLRA determines negotiability by analyzing whether the proposal directly interferes with a management
right.' 0 9 While the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit recently reaffirmed in broad terms that § 7106(a)
rights are subordinate to § 7106(b)(2) procedures," 0 the FLRA and
courts effectively limit this view every time they utilize the "acting at
all" or "direct interference" tests.
counterproposal "would directly interfere with the mission-related purpose for
method or means was adopted." Id. at 1531-32. If such a direct interference exists,
has no duty to bargain because the union proposal only deals with a permissive
bargaining.
104. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(2).
105. Department of Defense, Army-Air Force Exch. Serv. v. FLRA, 659 F.2d

which the
the agency
subject of

1140, 1153

(D.C. Cir. 1981).
106. The court stressed the need for differentiating between § 7106(b)(2) procedures and
§ 7106(a) substantive rights, lest a "procedure is to be permitted to swallow substance entirely."

Id. at 1152.
107. See National Fed'n Fed. Employees, Local 1745 v. FLRA, 828 F.2d 834, 840 (D.C. Cir.
1987).
108. See i&i (citing Department of Defense v. FLRA, 659 F.2d 110, 1152-53 (1981)).
109. See iUL(citing 659 F.2d at 1159).
110. See Association Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter 29 v. FLRA, 22 F.3d 1150,
1155 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
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Section 7106(b)(3) is treated by the FLRA and courts in a similar
fashion. Section 7106(b)(3) identifies "appropriate arrangements for
employees adversely affected by the exercise of" management authority as mandatory subjects of bargaining."1 However, like proposed
procedures, union proposals must be properly classified as appropriate arrangements before the FLRA will find them negotiable. A
union first must show that its proposal relates only to adverse effects

produced by the exercise of management's reserved rights." 2 Beyond
finding a relation to adverse effects, the FLRA still must determine
whether the union proposal constitutes "an appropriate arrangement.""13 To do this, the FLRA utilizes the "excessive interference
test" as developed by then Judge Scalia and the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit." 4
In American Federationof Government Employees, Local 2872 v.

FLRA," 5 Judge Scalia noted in dicta that the prefatory clause to
6
§ 7106(b), which states "[n]othing in this section shall preclude,"
can either be interpreted as clarifying or limiting language.1 7 Judge
Scalia explained that while the prefatory clause acted as clarifying language in relation to § 7106(b)(2), it acted as limiting language to
§ 7106(b)(3).1 8 Therefore, § 7106(b)(2) should be treated as mutually
exclusive of § 7106(a) reserved rights. However, § 7106(b)(3) is a limitation, or exception, to § 7106(a) reserved rights." 9 Thus, the FLRA
could not declare a union proposal concerning appropriate arrange111. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3).
112. The proposal must "redress only those employees adversely affected by a management
action." United States Dep't of Interior, Minerals Management Serv., New Orleans, La. v.
FLRA, 969 F.2d 1158, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1992); accord United States Dep't of Justice, Immigration
and Naturalization Serv. v. FLRA, 975 F.2d 218, 225 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding an appropriate
arrangement must narrowly protect those employees adversely affected by the exercise of management rights).
113. National Treasury Employees Union, Ch. 26, 22 F.L.R.A. 314, 317 (1986).
114. See National Ass'n Gov't Employees, Local R14-87, 21 F.L.R.A. 24, 30 (1986).
115. 702 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
116. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b).
117. See American Fed'n Gov't Employees, Local 2872, 702 F.2d at 1186. Judge Scalia provided the following hypothetical to explain the difference:
For example, a provision saying that "red is included" may be followed by a statement
that "nothing in this section shall apply to dark pink." When this clarifying language
usage is employed, something which comes within the proviso cannot simultaneously
come within the principal provision. The two categories are mutually exclusive-the
color is either red or dark pink. In other instances, however, the proviso is used genuinely to alter what precedes: "Nothing in this section shall apply to red tint No. 43."
Under this usage, the excepted item is included both within the principal provision and
(in order to except it) within the proviso-red tint No. 43 is red.
Id. at 1186-87.
118. See id. at 1187.
119. See id.
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ments nonnegotiable simply because it infringed on a management re20
served right.
Nevertheless, Judge Scalia hesitated to declare that § 7106(b)(3)
was an absolute exception to § 7106(a) reserved rights by centering on
the adjective "appropriate.''
Some arrangements proposed by a
union still might be inappropriate because they "impinge upon management prerogatives to an excessive degree.' 22 Based on this statement, the FLRA adopted the "excessive interference test" to
determine whether an arrangement proposed by a union would still be
23
trumped by a management right.'
One point from the preceding judicial history should be stressed.
The FLRA and courts consistently have recognized that two of the
three subsections of § 7106(b) are not absolute exceptions to
§ 7106(a). Although § 7106(b)'s priority over § 7106(a) has sometimes been described in overly broad terms, 124 the FLRA and courts
have not relied on this priority to totally eviscerate § 7106(a) reserved
rights. Specifically, § 7106(b)(2) procedures cannot prevent an agency
from acting at all; nor can it directly interfere with the exercise of a
reserved right.125 Similarly, a § 7106(b)(3) arrangement cannot excessively interfere with the exercise of a § 7106(a) reserved right lest it be
declared "inappropriate."'1 26 Thus, by using tests to determine when a
union proposal is properly defined as a procedure or appropriate arrangement, the courts and FLRA have effectively established mutual
exclusivity between § 7106(a) and (b) and limited the scope of
§ 7106(b) subjects of bargaining.

120. "The Authority is incorrect, therefore, in its conclusion that proof of coverage by subsection (a) is automatically proof of nonexemption under subsection (b)." Id.
121. Appropriate describes the "arrangements for employees adversely affected by the exer-

cise of any authority under this section by such management officials." 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3).
122. American Fed'n Gov't Employees, Local 2782, 702 F.2d at 1188.
123. See National Ass'n Gov't Employees, Local R14-87, 21 F.L.R.A. at 30. The FLRA

weighs the "competing practical needs of employees and managers" to determine whether a
proposed arrangement excessively interferes with a management reserved right. Id. at 31-32.
124. "Section 7106, we held, makes clear that the duty to bargain over matters falling under
subsections (b)(2) and (b)(3) exists 'notwithstanding that implementation of the proposal would
affect the enumerated managerial rights.' . . . In that sense, we have already decided that
§ 7106(b) is indisputably an exception to § 7106(a)." Association Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air
Ch. No. 29 v. FLRA, 22 F.3d 1150, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (citations omitted) (quoting American
Fed. Gov't Employees, Local 1923 v. FLRA, 819 F.2d 306, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).

125. See supra text accompanying notes 108-10.
126. See American Fed'n Gov't Employees, Local 2782, 702 F.2d at 1188.
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II.

EXECUTIVE ORDER

§ 7106(a)

12871
AND

AND ITS EFFECTS ON

(b)(1)

Critical opinions of the FSLMRS emerged in the late 1980s. 127 In
1988, the House Subcommittee on Civil Service held hearings concerning the effectiveness of federal labor-management relations under
the FSLMRS. 128 Although the hearings did not lead to any modifications to the FSLMRS, the hearings did highlight the increasing dissatisfaction of federal unions with the federal labor-management
system. 129
In 1991, the United States General Accounting Office ("GAO")
surveyed experts in federal labor relations to determine how well the
federal labor relations program was working. 30 GAO found that
most of these experts agreed that federal collective bargaining had not
achieved the goals of the FSLMRS 13 ' and had produced overly legalistic and adversarial relationships between management and unions
over minor disputes. 132 Since federal sector unions, unlike the private
sector, could not provide their members with substantial gains such as
increased wages and fringe benefits, they were prompted to present an
activist image by fully challenging agencies on those minor issues
which were within their bargaining power. 133 The survey respondents
127. See, e.g., Charles J. Coleman, Federal Sector Labor Relations: A Reevaluation of the
Policies, 16 J.CoLL Crrv NEGOTATIONS PUa. SEcrOR 37, 44 (1987) ("The limited scope of
bargaining in the Executive Branch appears to breed a kind of frustration that often has dysfunctional consequences .. ");FLRA Official Faults Practitionersfor Excess "Litigation and Minutiae," 27 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (BNA) No. 1336, at 1361 (Oct. 23, 1989) (FLRA Regional

Director blaming union "hair-trigger" filings and agency "boilerplate denials" for excess litigation); Judith Havemann, FederalLabor Relations: An Administrative Maze, WASH. POST, Apr. 5,
1988, at A19 (comparing federal labor-management law to "the machinery of the United Na-

tions... resolv[ing] a fender-bender"); Parker et al., supranote 82, at 176 (finding no significant
change in labor-management relations in the federal government since passage of the CSRA).
Title VII of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978: Hearing Before the SubcommL on 28
Service of the House Comm. Post Office and Civil Service, 100th Cong. (1988).
129. Representative Schroeder, after describing several "frightening examples" of labormanagement disputes, declared Congress must "fix this mess soon." Id. at 1-2. Robert Tobias,
President of the National Treasury Employees Union, called for entirely eliminating the
FSLMRS and replacing it with a system of partnerships where "one party cannot gain without
the other." Frank Swoboda, Civil Service Law Needs Another Overhaul, Union Chiefs Say,
WASH. PosT, June 9, 1988, at A17.
130. GAO, supra note 1, at 14-15.
131. The goals of the FSLMRS included efficient government, the settlement of labor-management disputes in a less adversarial manner, and the involvement of government employees in
decisions affecting their working conditions. See id. at 18.
132. See id.
133. As one agency official stated, "[t]he minutiae we have to bargain over is a trade off. It is
sort of cathartic in the fact that it lets the unions believe that they are really negotiating something, while from management's standpoint, they are non-important issues." Id. at 21. Examples
of trivial issues included radio use at worksites, coffee consumption on breaks, the removal of a
water cooler, and requirements for civilian guards to salute military personnel. See id. at 20-21.
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also agreed that the dispute resolution processes were "too slow, complex, and susceptible to delaying and stalling tactics by the parties
involved."1

34

In partial response to this growing dissatisfaction with the federal
labor-management relations program, Vice-President Al Gore's National Performance Review ("NPR") 135 recommended the creation of
a National Partnership Council to help encourage the establishment of
labor-management partnerships throughout the federal government. 136 The theory of cooperative relations between labor and management had gained support as a more effective and efficient means of
labor relations versus the traditional adversarial and legalistic relationships described by GAO. 137 In addition, the NPR recommended
that the National Partnership Council propose changes to the
FSLMRS that would encourage the success of federal sector
38
partnerships.1
In response to the NPR's recommendations, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12871 which mandated federal agencies to establish a new cooperative system of bargaining with their respective
unions. 139 President Clinton envisioned that the creation of new federal sector partnerships would "champion change in Federal Government agencies to transform them into organizations capable of
40
delivering the highest quality services to the American people.'
Besides mandating partnerships throughout the federal government, President Clinton ordered agencies and subordinate officials to
bargain over previously permissive subjects enumerated under
134. Id. at 41.

135. The NPR was a 6-month study of the federal government directed by Vice-President
Gore in 1993 to "make government work better and cost less." NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, FROM RED TAPE TO RESULTS: CREATING

A GOVERNMENT THAT WORKS BETITER &

COSTS LESS at i (1993).

136. See id.at 88.
137. See, e.g., TEAMWORK: JOINT LABOR-MANAGEMENT PROGRAMS IN AMERICA (Jerome
M. Rosow ed., 1986) (providing case studies of labor-management joint efforts); Ira B. Lobel,
Labor-ManagementCooperation:A Critical View, 43 LAB. L.J. 281 (1992) (describing the value
of cooperative efforts between labor and management in certain circumstances); Alexander B.
Trowbridge, Avoiding Labor-ManagementConflict, MGMT. REV., Feb. 1988 at 46 (stressing the
need for labor-management cooperation and describing new cooperative approaches); Paula B.
Voos, The Influence of Cooperative Programs on Union-Management Relations, Flexibility, and
Other Labor Relations Outcomes, 10 J. LAB.RES. 103 (1989) (providing survey results indicating
that quality of worklife programs generally have positive effects on union-management relations). But cf. Wilson McLeod, Labor-Management Cooperation: Competing Visions and Labor's Challenge, 12 INDUS. REL. L.J. 233 (1990) (warning that cooperation with management will
not produce benefits for unions).
138. See NATIONAL PERFORMANCE REVIEW, supra note 135, at 88.
139. Order 12,871, supra note 8, at 657, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7101, at 1033.
140. Order 12,871, supra note 8, at 655, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7101, at 1033.
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§ 7106(b)(1). 141 Agencies now were required to bargain over "the
numbers, types, and grades of employees or positions assigned to any
organizational subdivision, work project, or tour of duty, or on the
technology, methods, and means of performing work.' 42 Executive
Order 12871 effectively created only two categories of subjects of bargaining in the federal sector: mandatory and prohibited.
Prior to ACT, the Executive Order's mandate would not have
presented federal agencies with difficult bargaining choices. Before
ACT, most members of the federal labor relations community believed that conflict with § 7106(a) reserved rights still could relieve an
agency from the duty to bargain with a union over § 7106(b)(1) subjects. 143 Therefore, notwithstanding the Executive Order, an agency
assumed it was under no obligation to negotiate a union proposal
under § 7106(b)(1) if the proposal also conflicted with a § 7106(a) reserved right. As developed in the next Section however, ACT, in- conjunction with Executive Order 12871, denied an agency this option
and effectively presented unions with a way to begin negotiating
§ 7106(a) reserved rights.
III.

A.

THE ACTDECISION

FLRA's Initial Decision

In National Guard Bureau, Alexandria, Virginia and Association
of Civiiian Technicians, Montana Air Chapter No. 29,144 the union had
executed a collective bargaining agreement with the Montana National Guard. Article 23 of the agreement authorized bargaining unit
"employees to have the option of wearing either the military uniform
or an agreed-upon standard civilian attire."'1 45 However, when the
Montana National Guard sent the agreement to the National Guard
Bureau in Alexandria, Virginia for final approval, the National Guard
Bureau rejected Article 23 because it violated: (1) a national policy
concerning the wearing of uniforms and (2) management's reserved
141. See Order 12,871, supra note 8, at 657, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7101, at 1033, 1034.
142. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1)(1994).
143. The U.S. Office of Personnel Management acknowledged that a § 7106(b)(1) subject
would become nonnegotiable if in direct conflict with a § 7106(a) right when it advised agencies

and unions to "focus on the intent of the proposal and on ways to reformulate it in a manner that
does not result in a conflict with § 7106(a)." NATIONAL PARTNERSHIP COUNCIL, PARTNERSHIP
HANDBOOK 31 (1994); see also FLRA REFERRAL, supra note 93, at 5 (indicating that case law
before Executive Order 12871 held that § 7106(a) rendered a proposal nonnegotiable even
though falling within § 7106(b)(1)).
144. 45 F.L.R.A. 506 (1992), rev'd sub nom., Association of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air
Chapter 29 v. FLRA, 22 F.3d 1150 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
145. Id. at 507.
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rights to determine internal security practices. 146 The union subse147
quently filed an unfair labor practice charge against the agency.
The FLRA General Counsel and union contended that, under
§ 7114(c)(2), the agency head was precluded from rejecting the collective bargaining agreement' 48 unless the agreement violated "the provisions of [the FSLMRS] and any other applicable law, rule, or
regulation."'1 49 The union separately maintained that the agency could
not use the defense of a violation of § 7106(a)(1) because the wearing
of uniforms is a method and means of performing work under
§ 7106(b)(1), and all subjects contained in § 7106(b) are clearly exceptions to § 7106(a). 150
The FLRA found that the National Guard Bureau did not commit an unfair labor practice by refusing to approve the uniform
clause.' 51 Without elaboration, the FLRA rejected the union's argument by simply stating it was "unsupported by case law or any other
explanation."152
B.

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit's Reversal
The union appealed the FLRA's decision to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.' 53 The court
reversed the FLRA's decision, finding that a literal reading of the
FSLMRS, in addition to prior case law, supported the conclusion that
§ 7106(b)(1) subjects were exceptions to § 7106(a) reserved rights. 154
Because the agency agreed on a § 7106(b)(1) permissive subject, and
because § 7106(b)(1) is an exception to management's § 7106(a) reserved rights, the agency head could not later rely on § 7106(a) as a
55
reason for refusing to approve the uniform agreement.
Without refering to legislative history, the court relied on the
plain language of the FSLMRS and stated "Congress has spoken to
146. See id. at 507-08.
147. See id. at 506.
148. See id. at 508, 512.
149. 5 U.S.C. § 7114(c)(2) (1994).
150. See National Guard Bureau Alexandria, Va., 45 F.L.R.A. at 512. The FLRA General
Counsel did not use this argument.
151. See id. at 520.
152. Id.
153. See Association of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter 29 v. FLRA, 22 F.3d 1150
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
154. See id. at 1155-56.

155. It is important to note that the court presumed the uniform proposal fell within both the
meaning of § 7106(b)(1) as a means of performing work and § 7106(a) as an internal security
practice. The FLRA and the agency conceded this point on appeal. See id. at 1154.
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the precise issue in question and commanded a result contrary to that
arrived at by the FLRA.' 1 56 The court also relied on its own past
interpretations of the relationship between § 7106(a) and § 7106(b)(2)
and (3) to support the view that § 7106(b)(1) was an exception to
§ 7106(a). 157 Actually utilizing the word "exception," the court indicated that a § 7106(b)(1) permissive subject of bargaining is negotiaof the proposal's
ble at the election of an agency regardless
158
interference with a § 7106(a) reserved right.
Prior to Executive Order 12871, the court's decision would have
affected federal agencies minimally. The narrow ruling of ACT only
prohibited an agency head from later overturning a locally negotiated
contract if the subject matter was a § 7106(b)(1) permissive subject of
bargaining. 59 However, local agency officials still could have initially
refused to bargain with the union on the wearing of uniforms, 160 leaving the union with no recourse, since methods and means of perform6
ing work are only permissive subjects of bargaining.' '
But, due to Executive Order 12871, an agency no longer has the
discretion to initially refuse to bargain a § 7106(b)(1) subject. 162 After
ACT, federal agencies face the potential of negotiating with unions
§ 7106(b)(1) subjects that also infringe on § 7106(a) reserved rights.
C. FLRA's Response to ACT
The General Counsel of the FLRA recognized that ACT "made it
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for ... agencies ...to enter into
improved consensual and collaborative relationships with their employees' elected representatives."'1 63 Federal agencies and unions
were tempted to engage "in legal gymnastics over the scope of bargaining" instead of avoiding litigation through the exercise of labormanagement partnerships. 164 To provide guidance and settle the un156. Id. at 1156.
157. See id. at 1155.

158. See id.
159. See idi at 1155-56.
160. See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
161. See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1) (1994).
162. See supra Part II.
163. FLRA ADVICE, supra note *,at 2.
164. Id. The General Counsel provided an example of the typical strategic positions adopted
by management and union officials:
(T]he union requests to negotiate over matters, either as part of midcontract or change
bargaining, which matters clearly fall within subsection (b)(1). The agency responds
that it firmly believes in the principles in the Executive Order and is committed to
bargain over subsection (b)(1) matters as mandated by the Executive Order, BUT, the
particular matter or proposal presented also is within subsection (a) and thus the
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certainty created by ACT, the General Counsel asked the FLRA to
decide the following policy issue:
Are matters and proposals which are within the bargaining subjects
set forth in section 7106(b)(1) of the Statute negotiable at the election of the agency management at the level of exclusive recognition
even though those matters and proposals also may be within the
subjects set forth in section 7106(a) of the Statute? 165
The FLRA subsequently issued a questionnaire in the Federal
Register to members of the federal labor relations community seeking
their opinions on the need for a policy ruling and how the uncertainty
between § 7106(a) and (b)(1) should be resolved. 166 The FLRA General Counsel joined almost two dozen respondents consisting of unions, agencies, and individuals in answering the FLRA's request. 167
The FLRA ended the speculation about whether it would adopt the
ACT decision in October 1995 with its decision in National Association of Government Employees Local R5-184.168 The FLRA adopted
the ACT court's rationale in ruling § 7106(b)(1) "was indisputably an
exception to § 7106(a)."'1 69 The FLRA also explained how it would

subsequently treat union claims concerning § 7106(b)(1) subjects of
bargaining. First, the FLRA will determine whether
the proposal concerns matters within the subjects set forth in section 7106(b)(1). If it does, we will not address contentions that
those matters also affect the exercise of management's authorities
under section 7106(a). Conversely, if we conclude that a proposal
does not concern matters within the subjects set forth in section
7106(b)(1), we will then proceed
170 to analyze it under the appropriate
subsection of section 7106(a).
However, the FLRA continued to recognize that an agency still
has total discretion whether to initially negotiate the subject. Relying
agency is prohibited from negotiations. The union then accuses the agency of avoiding,

or reneging on, partnership and the agency responds that it is the union which is not
engaging in partnership principles.
FLRA REFERRAL, supra note 93, at 7.
165. FLRA REFERRAL, supra note 93, at 1.

166. See Notice Relating to the Issuance of a Policy Statement, 60 Fed. Reg. 14,285-86
(1995).
167. See Michael Arian, Comments on FLRA Request Include Options from GeneralCounsel
on Resolving Negotiability Issues Posed by Section 7106 Provisions, 33 Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep.
(Warren, Gorham & Lamont) 684, 684 (May 15, 1995).
168. 51 F.L.R.A. 386 (1995). The FLRA decided to use a factual case rather than a general
policy ruling as a vehicle for explaining its future treatment of § 7106(a) and (b)(1). See Order
Denying Request for a General Ruling, 51 F.L.R.A. 409, 412 (1995).
169. NationalAss'n Gov't Employees, Local R5-184, 51 F.L.R.A. at 392 (quoting Association
of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter 29 v. FLRA, 22 F.3d 1150, 1155 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
170. Id. at 393 (footnote omitted).
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on its own regulations, 17' the FLRA did not reach the issue of
whether the agency had already "chosen" to bargain the § 7106(b)(1)
subject due to Executive Order 12871.172
However, the case utilized by the FLRA to showcase its new test
was not particularly controversial and did not reveal how the FLRA
would treat future cases involving factually ambiguous issues. The
FLRA decided that several union proposals properly comprised subjects of bargaining within § 7106(b)(1). 173 These union proposals
dealt with (1) the move of one full-time employee to an organizational
subdivision and (2) the change of one part-time employee's tour of
duty. 174 However, the two proposals were limited in nature, and the
FLRA found no ambiguity over whether the proposals could properly
be classified as § 7106(b)(1) subjects of bargaining. 175 As developed
in the next Section, unions could propose more ambiguous
§ 7106(b)(1) bargaining subjects 176 that infringe on management's re171. The regulations provide that "[i]f the Authority finds that the duty to bargain extends to
the matter.., only at the election of the agency, the Authority shall ... issue an order dismissing
the petition for review of the negotiability issue." 5 C.F.R. § 2424.10(b) (1996).
172. See National Ass'n Gov't Employees, Local R5-184, 51 F.L.R.A. at 394. In effect, the
FLRA decided not to recognize Executive Order 12871. It will dismiss a negotiability appeal
once it finds a union proposal concerns a § 7106(b)(1) subject.
However, this approach has not avoided the possibility of an agency being forced to negotiate a § 7106(a) reserved right because of Executive Order 12871. The General Counsel has
indicated that it will treat Executive Order 12871 as an agency's election, by the President, to
negotiate over § 7106(b)(1) subjects. See FLRA ADVICE, supra note *, at 7. As such, an agency

official at the local level cannot refuse to negotiate a § 7106(b)(1) subject where a higher agency
official has already decided to negotiate the issue. See id. The General Counsel indicated that if
an investigation revealed an agency refused to negotiate over a union proposal solely within
§ 7106(b)(1) (and not also within § 7106(a)), the Office of General Counsel would issue a complaint against the agency. See id. at 4. The General Counsel has been unsuccessful in convincing
FLRA administrative law judges with this argument. In a 1996 decision, an administrative law
judge rejected the General Counsel's reasoning in favor of the disclaimer found in section 3 of
Executive Order 12871, stating the Order does not "create a right to administrative or judicial
review." See Department of the Air Force, 647th Air Base Group, FLRA No. BN-CA-41011, at
4-5 (July 1996).
A recent decision by the Federal Service Impasses Panel ("FSIP"), see infra note 188, raises
another avenue for the forced negotiation of § 7106(a) reserved rights. See In re Department of
Veterans Affairs, Palo Alto Health Care Sys., Palo Alto, Cal., No. 96 FSIP 1, 1996 FSIP LEXIS 5
(Mar. 20, 1996). The FSIP exercised jurisdiction because it considered Executive Order 12871 as
President Clinton's election on the agency's behalf to negotiate the issue. See id at *5. The FSIP
reasoned that the union proposal was still negotiable because it comprised a § 7106(b)(1) issuea clear exception to § 7106(a) in light of the FLRA's recent adoption of the ACT rationale. See
id. Therefore, in addition to unfair labor practice charges, agencies could soon encounter more
FSIP-brokered decisions that infringe on § 7106(a) reserved rights.
173. See National Ass'n Gov't Employees, Local R5-184, 51 F.L.R.A. at 395, 398.
174. See id.
175. For example, there was no ambiguity over whether the employee's office was an organizational subdivision; an agency memorandum described the particular department as a subdivision. See id. at 395.
176. The FLRA recently had an opportunity to reapply its procedure for resolving disputes
over permissible and mandatory subjects in American Fed'n of Gov't Employees Council of Lo-

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 72:837

served rights to a greater degree than the two subjects in National
Association of Government Employees Local R5-184.
IV.
A.

EVALUATION OF

ACT

Ramifications of ACT on FederalAgencies

ACT, in conjunction with Executive Order 12871, has effectively
expanded the number of subjects federal sector unions can bargain.
While the ACT court simply declared § 7106(b)(1) an exception to
§ 7106(a), 177 it failed to address how to define a § 7106(b)(1) subject
in relation to § 7106(a) reserved rights. Without further clarification,
the court's words imply that any proposal designated a § 7106(b)(1)
subject-regardless of even severe interference with an agency's ability to determine its mission budget and other reserved rights-is negotiable at an agency official's discretion.
Furthermore, Executive Order 12871 forces all agency officials to
bargain § 7106(b)(1) subjects.' 78 Therefore, a resourceful union representative can now craft a proposal couched in terms of § 7106(b)(1)
and, because of ACT and Executive Order 12871, effectively force an
agency to negotiate subjects like an agency's budget and mission. Two
bargaining scenarios follow that highlight extreme examples of this
expansion of mandatory bargaining subjects.
The FLRA defined firearms as a means of performing work when
determining whether a union proposal dealt with a general condition
of employment versus a § 7106(b)(1) permissive subject of bargaining. 179 Prior to Executive Order 12871, a union like the National
Treasury Employees Union ("NTEU") could not bargain with the
U.S. Customs Service over the type of firearms used by Customs Inspectors at U.S. borders unless Customs chose to do so. Because of
Executive Order 12871, Customs now must negotiate with NTEU
cals No. 163, 51 F.L.R.A. No. 123, 1996 WL 379495 (July 3, 1996) (2-1 decision). In a split
decision, the majority decided that the union proposal for limiting the length of temporary duty

assignments did not involve the number or types of employees assigned to an organizational
subdivision. See id. at *1, *4. They relied on both the plain wording of the proposal and the

union's interpretation. See id. at *5. However, as Member Wasserman's dissent shows, the
FLRA may go beyond the literal language of a union proposal and find a § 7106(b)(1) permissive subject. See id. at *9 (Wasserman, Member, dissenting) (relying on the record to assume the
union proposal would force the agency to increase the number of employees on the work project, and therefore concluding the union proposal comprised a § 7106(b)(1) subject).
177. See Association of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter 29 v. FLRA, 22 F.3d 1150,
1155 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

178. See Order 12,871, supra note 8, at 657, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7101, at 1033-34.
179. See American Fed'n of Gov't Employees, Int'l Council of U.S. Marshals Serv. Locals, 4
F.L.R.A. 384, 387 (1980).
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about the type of firearms used by Customs Inspectors if NTEU so
proposes.'80 Because of ACT, Customs must also negotiate the type
of firearms used by Customs Inspectors regardless of the impact of the
union's proposal on the agency's budget.181 For example, NTEU
could propose that each Customs Inspector be equipped with expensive assault rifles instead of handguns for defense. Even if the total
cost for replacing all handguns with rifles and training Inspectors on
their use would severely handicap Customs' ability to maintain its
budget, Customs would have no choice but to negotiate this matter
with NTEU in good faith based on ACT and existing definitions of
means of performing work.
Another example involves management's determination of the
"numbers, types, and grades of employees" assigned to a "tour of
duty.' 82 Before Executive Order 12871, a union like the National
Association of Air Traffic Controllers ("NATCA") could not negotiate with the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") about the exact number of Air Traffic Control Specialists ("ATCS") to be assigned
on a tour of duty at a particular FAA facility unless the FAA chose to
do so. Because of Executive Order 12871, the FAA must now negotiate with NATCA about the proper number of ATCSs serving on a
tour of duty if NATCA so proposes. 8 3 Because of ACT, the FAA
must also negotiate the union proposal despite its effects' on the
FAA's mission to provide safe and efficient service to the traveling
public. 85 For example, NATCA could propose to reduce the number
of ATCSs assigned to a tour of duty during the busiest air traffic time
at an airport and increase the numbers on a less-congested tour of
duty in order to maximize the chances for ATCS overtime pay. Even
if NATCA's proposed ATCS level during busy traffic time would effectively shut down the airport to a trickle of daily flights, and there180. See Order 12,871, supra note 8, at 657, reprintedin 5 U.S.C. § 7101, at 1033-34.
181. Cf.Association of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter 29, 22 F.3d at 1155.
182. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1) (1994).
183. See Order 12,871, supra note 8, at 657, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7101, at 1033-34. However, Congress recently directed the FAA to negotiate facets of FAA's new personnel management system with those unions representing FAA personnel. See Federal Aviation
Reauthorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-264, § 253, 110 Stat. 3213, 3237 (1996). As a result,
unions representing FAA employees now are among the very few federal sector unions that
have the right to negotiate previously prohibited issues such as compensation, benefits, and job
classification. See NATCA Becomes First Federal Union to Gain Full Negotiability Rights, 34
Gov't Empl. Rel. Rep. (Warren, Gorham & Lamont) No. 1685, at 1445 (Oct. 14, 1996).
184. Cf.Association of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter 29, 22 F.3d at 1155.
185. "[T]he [FAA] Administrator shall consider . . .controlling the use of the navigable
airspace and regulating civil and military operations ... in the interest of the safety and efficiency of both of those operations." 49 U.S.C. § 40101(d)(3) (1994), amended by Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-264, § 401, 110 Stat. 3213, 3255 (1996).
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fore force the FAA to expend more overtime funds to maintain traffic
levels, the FAA would have no choice but to negotiate the proposal
with NATCA according to ACT and existing definitions of numbers of
employees assigned to a tour of duty.
An agency confronted with such extreme union proposals 8 6 does
not have to agree automatically to the union's demands. However,
the agency would have an obligation to bargain in good faith with the
union over the extreme proposal. 187 Thus, Executive Order 12871, in
conjunction with the ACT decision, creates the potential for an agency
to engage in inefficient and fruitless negotiations over frivolous union
proposals. Regardless of the likelihood for favorable treatment of an
extreme union proposal by an arbitrator or the Federal Service Impasses Panel, 88 an agency would have no choice but to negotiate a
§ 7106(b)(1) proposal that concurrently comprised a § 7106(a) right.
In the event an agency ultimately agreed to an extreme union proposal couched in § 7106(b)(1) terms, the agency may have negotiated
away a § 7106(a) reserved right. It is unlikely that Congress intended
to grant federal agencies the discretion to negotiate their reserved
rights completely away when it structured § 7106.189 The above extreme bargaining proposals highlight the ultimate implications of
maintaining that § 7106(b)(1) is an exception to § 7106(a) without
redefining § 7106(b)(1) subjects.

186. The above two hypotheticals do not address an agency's potential negotiability defense

based on an inconsistency with a federal law or regulation. See supra text accompanying notes

29-30. For example, an agency could hypothetically claim undue interference with an annual
congressional appropriations bill if a union proposal falling under § 7106(b)(1) would actually
call for exceeding the agency's budget. Similarly, an agency potentially could claim interference

with an agency's stated mission in the preamble of a statute.

187. An agency commits an unfair labor practice if it fails to "consult or negotiate in good
faith with a labor organization." 5 U.S.C. § 7116(a)(5) (1994).

188. The Federal Service Impasses Panel ("FSIP") is an entity within the FLRA which has
authority to resolve impasses arising from negotiations about conditions of employment between
agencies and unions. See 5 U.S.C. § 7119(c)(1). Either the agency or union may request FSIP
intervention. See 5 U.S.C. § 7119(b)(1). An impasse is a "point in the negotiation of conditions
of employment at which the parties are unable to reach agreement." 5 C.F.R. § 2470.2(e) (1996).
The FSIP may utilize a wide range of techniques for resolving impasses such as ordering binding
arbitration and issuing final binding orders and decisions. See 5 C.F.R. § 2471.11(a). The FSIP

would have jurisdiction over any true negotiation impasse between an agency and union, including an impasse over a § 7106(b)(1) permissive subject of bargaining. Cf. supra note 172.
189. Cf H.R. REP. No. 95-1717, at 154 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2888

(explaining that an agency must not negotiate "general policy questions determining how an
agency does its work").
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B. ACT's Inconsistency With the Plain Language of the FSLMRS
and Rules of Statutory Construction
The ACT court declared § 7106(b) an exception to the general
nonnegotiability of § 7106(a) reserved rights. 19° However, this view
does not correspond with the plain language of the FSLMRS. In addition, the ACT court's declaration of § 7106(b)(1) priority without a
further redefinition of § 7106(b)(1) subjects violates an accepted approach to statutory construction.
As an exception, 191 the ACT court acknowledged that a union
proposal could constitute both a § 7106(b)(1) and (a) subject.' 9 2 Thus,
the court blurred the distinction between prohibited and permissive
subjects of bargaining. The plain language of § 7106 does not indicate
§ 7106(b) is an exception to § 7106(a) as the court in ACT held. The
use of the words "subject to"193 instead of "except" implies Congress
did not intend § 7106(b)(1) subjects to otherwise be included in the
§ 7106(a) category of reserved rights. If Congress intended § 7106(b)
subjects simultaneously to incorporate § 7106(a) reserved rights, it explicitly could have used the word "except" as it did in numerous sections of the FSLMRS. 194
Adopting the dicta of Judge Scalia, 95 the prefatory clauses to
§ 7106(a) and (b) act as clarifying language to emphasize the distinct
character of mandatory, permissive, and prohibited subjects of bargaining. Therefore, a union proposal should be classified as either
falling within § 7106(a) or (b), but not both. By adopting this mutual
exclusivity view combined with narrow definitions of § 7106(b)(1)
subjects, the FLRA would avoid the possibility of a union proposal
190. See Association of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter 29 v. FLRA, 22 F.3d 1150,
1155 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

191. "An 'exception' operates to take something out of a thing granted which would other-

wise pass or be included." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 559 (6th ed. 1990).

192. Cf.Association of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter 29, 22 F.3d at 1155.
193. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a) (1994). The accepted meanings of "subject to" include "governed or
affected by" and "provided that." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 1425 (6th. ed. 1990). The meaning
of "provided that" corresponds to Representative Ford's view that § 7106(a) management rights
were "conditioned" on the negotiations of § 7106(b) procedures and appropriate arrangements.
Cf.124 CONG. REC. 38,715 (1978).

194. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7112(b)(1) (1994) (referring to exceptions to the inappropriateness
of a bargaining unit that includes supervisors); 5 U.S.C. § 7121(a)(1) (referring to exceptions to
the restriction that any grievance procedures outlined in a collective bargaining agreement shall
be the exclusive procedures for resolving grievances); 5 U.S.C. § 7131(d) (referring to exceptions
to an agency's granting of official time to employees representing unions).
195. See American Fed'n Gov't Employees, Local 2782 v. FLRA, 702 F.2d 1183, 1186-87
(D.C. Cir. 1983).
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couched in terms of § 7106(b)(1) excessively interfering with an
agency's ability to exercise its reserved rights.
Maintaining mutual exclusivity between § 7106(a) reserved rights
and § 7106(b)(1) subjects of bargaining is important in order to avoid
196
a situation like ACT where a court must decide subsection priority.
To hold that a union proposal can deal with both a § 7106(b)(1) subject and a § 7106(a) right forces a reviewing body to create a hierarchy
to determine negotiability. However, Congress created two separate
and distinct categories: broad reserved management rights 197 and narrower, specifically worded subjects of bargaining. 198
ACT's expansion of negotiable subjects also violates an accepted
approach to statutory construction.199 Designating § 7106(b)(1) as an
exception without additionally narrowly defining § 7106(b)(1) subjects
raises the possibility of an agency bargaining away its budget, mission,
organization, and other reserved rights 2°° to a union. However, "all
words in a statute are to be assigned meaning, and ...nothing therein
is to be construed as surplusage. '1 20 1 The ACT court in effect made
§ 7106(a) superfluous. The court's determination that: (1) a
§ 7106(b)(1) subject can simultaneously embody a reserved management right 20 2 and (2) a § 7106(b)(1) subject is always a negotiable exception to a reserved right 20 3 begs the question of why Congress
bothered to construct two separate subsections differentiating between prohibited and permissive subjects of bargaining. 20 4 By not articulating any restraints on § 7106(b)(1) subjects, the ACT court
tacitly acknowledged that an agency at its discretion can negotiate its
budget, mission, organization, and numbers of employees 20 5 just as
long as it couches the proposals in terms of § 7106(b)(1). The court
abolished any need for § 7106(a). If an agency can always negotiate a
196. Cf Association of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter 29, 22 F.3d at 1155.
197. Cf 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a).
198. Cf 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b).
199. See generally letter from Thomas F. Garnett, Jr., Director, Workforce Relations, Office
of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense, to Phyllis N. Segal, Chair,
FLRA 3-4 (Apr. 17, 1995) (on file with the FLRA); letter from William C. Owen, Assistant
Director of Personnel for Labor Management Relations, U.S. Department of Justice, to FLRA
5-9 (Apr. 17, 1995) (on file with the FLRA).
200. See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(1).
201. Lin Qi-Zhuo v. Meissner, 70 F.3d 136, 139 (D.C. Cir. 1995); see also United States v.
Menasche, 348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955) (describing a duty to give effect to all words rather than
emasculating an entire section of a statute).
202. Cf.Association of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter 29 v. FLRA, 22 F.3d 1150,
1155 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
203. See id.
204. See letter from William C. Owen, supra note 199, at 8.
205. See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(1).
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reserved right away by couching the negotiations in terms of
§ 7106(b)(1), there is no reason for Congress to have separated § 7106
into two subsections. If Congress truly intended to allow an agency to
negotiate its reserved rights with a union, Congress could have simply
20 6
prefaced § 7106(a) with the clause "at the election of the agency.
Ironically, the ACT court used this very rule of statutory construction to show why § 7106(b)(1) should be an exception to
§ 7106(a). 20 7 The court pointed out that the FLRA's interpretation
would make § 7106(b)(1) superfluous. 20 8 If an agency is permitted to
negotiate § 7106(b)(1) subjects but simultaneously is prohibited from
bargaining them because of § 7106(a), § 7106(b)(1) is rendered "nugatory."'2o9 However, at the same time, the court failed to recognize the
exact opposite holds true for § 7106(b)(1) acting as an exception to
§ 7106(a). An adoption of the mutual exclusivity interpretation would
avoid this apparent circular deadlock. By recognizing that a proposal
can only constitute a § 7106(b)(1) subject of bargaining or a § 7106(a)
reserved right, a court could then give effect to the wording in both
subsections.
C. ACT's Inconsistency With the Legislative History of the
FSLMRS
In holding that § 7106(b)(1) is an exception to § 7106(a), 210 the
ACT court failed to consider whether its interpretation corresponded
with congressional intent. First, the ramifications of the court's holding ignored Congress' original intention to ultimately restrict the
number of negotiable subjects of bargaining in order to provide an
efficient and effective public sector. 211 Second, the court ignored legislative history indicating that Congress intended the rights and subjects in § 7106(a) and (b) to be mutually exclusive. 212
The preface to the FSLMRS states "[t]he provisions of this chapter should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the requirement
of an effective and efficient Government. '213 This statement, in con206. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1).
207. See Association of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter 29, 22 F.3d at 1155 (citing

United States v. Menasche, 348 U.S. 528 (1955)); see also, letter from William C. Owen, supra
note 199, at 8.
208. See Association of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter29, 22 F.3d at 1155.

209.
210.
211.
212.

Id.
See id.
See 5 U.S.C. § 7101(a)(1)(B).
See discussion supra pp. 845-48.

213. 5 U.S.C. § 7101(b).
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junction with the selection from the Joint Conference Report describing limitations on negotiations on methods and means of performing
work, 214 indicates Congress did not intend federal sector unions to
share in broad policy decisions with agencies on matters such as an
agency's mission and budget.
However, as shown by the above bargaining scenarios, 215 a union
can now propose a § 7106(b)(1) subject for negotiation that effectively
would allow a union to share decision-making power in determining
general policy questions with an agency. Considering congressional
scrutiny of the FSLMRS during its passage and the fears regarding too
much expansion of federal sector union power, 216 it is unlikely Congress would have voted for a bill that broadened subjects of bargaining to such an extent.
The ACT court also did not acknowledge the legislative history
indicating § 7106(b) subjects were intended to be separate and limited
in scope from § 7106(a) reserved rights. Representative Ford's hypothetical concerning the transfer of employees 217 indicates management retains § 7106(a) rights on the condition that it first negotiates
procedures and appropriate arrangements with a union. This suggests
Congress did not conceptualize broad reserved rights as being
equivalent to specific § 7106(b) procedures and arrangements. The
statement in the Conference Committee Report describing certain
nonnegotiable matters and other matters negotiable at an agency's discretion 218 reinforces the view that § 7106(a) and (b)(1) are mutually
exclusive. Finally, the selection from the Conference Committee Report describing limitations on the scope of methods and means of performing work 219 reinforces the view that § 7106(b)(1) subjects are a
narrowly defined category separate from § 7106(a) reserved rights.
The ACT court also failed to acknowledge that its own precedent
does not treat § 7106(b) as an absolute exception to § 7106(a). In
commenting on both § 7106(b)(2) and (3), the court has held that
214. See H.R. REP. No. 95-1717, at 153-54 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N 2860,2887-

88.
215. See supra Part IV.A.
216. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 95-1403, at 404 (1978), reprinted in LEGISLAIVE HISTORY,

supra note 16, at 675, 730 (outlining Republican view that granting more bargaining power to
federal unions as "a dangerous step"); 124 CONG. REC. 21,884 (1978) (Representative Derwinski
commenting that H.R. 11,280 had expanded "the labor-management title ... to benefit labor
unions at the expense of sound managerial flexibility.").
217. 124 CONG. REc. 38,715 (1978).
218. H.R. REP. No. 95-1717, at 153, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2887.
219. H.R. REP. No. 95-1717, at 154, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2860, 2888.
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there always are negotiability limits to a union proposal dealing with
either a procedure or an appropriate arrangement.
The ACT court first cited American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 1923 v. FLRA, 220 ("AFGE") as support for holding
all of § 7106(b) is an exception to § 7106(a), notwithstanding an effect
on § 7106(a) management rights. 221 However, while the court in
AFGE initially stated § 7106(b)(2) and (3) were mandatory subjects
of bargaining regardless of an effect on management rights, it proceeded to describe in the next paragraph the accepted tests used to
differentiate a procedure and appropriate arrangement from a management right.222 These tests incorporate criteria to insure the union
proposal does not directly or excessively interfere with a management
reserved right. Thus, AFGE does not stand for the proposition that
any union proposal with the trappings of a procedure or arrangement
automatically trumps a § 7106(a) reserved right. Rather, AFGE acknowledges that appropriate arrangements and procedures are limited
in scope in relation to reserved rights and need to be defined narrowly. Only after the union proposal has been properly classified as a
procedure or appropriate arrangement can the statement be made
that an agency has a duty to bargain with § 7106(b) subjects, "notwithstanding that implementation ...would affect the enumerated managerial rights. '223
Therefore, the ACT court misused AFGE in trying to show
§ 7106(b)(1) was an exception to § 7106(a). Rather than supporting
the ACT court's holding that § 7106(b)(1) is an exception, AFGE implies § 7106(b)(1) should be treated as a narrow, mutually exclusive
category of bargaining subjects just like procedures and appropriate
arrangements. As such, clearly defined tests should be developed to
classify when a proposal truly concerns § 7106(b)(1) subjects or when
it effectively comprises negotiations over § 7106(a) reserved rights.
Only after such a test is applied should the statement of subsection
priority be made.
The ACT court next referenced American Federationof Government Employees, Local 2782 v. FLRA, 224 ("AFGE II") as support for
the view that all of § 7106(b) was an exception to § 7106(a). 225 How220. 819 F.2d 306 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
221. See Association of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter 29 v. FLRA, 22 F.3d 1150,
1155 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
222. See American Fed'n Gov't Employees, Local 1923, 819 F.2d at 308.
223. Id.
224. 702 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
225. See Association of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter29, 22 F.3d at 1155.
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ever, the court failed to acknowledge that Judge Scalia declared only
§ 7106(b)(3) an exception to § 7106(a), while maintaining the mutual
exclusivity of § 7106(b)(2) procedures. 226 Judge Scalia recognized that
§ 7106(b)(2) procedures were by their very nature mutually exclusive
from § 7106(a) substantive reserved rights.2 27 Furthermore, the ACT
court failed to acknowledge that Judge Scalia held a proper arrangement could still be inappropriate if it excessively interfered with a re228
served right.
Therefore, the ACT court misused its own precedent to declare
that § 7106(b)(1) was an exception to § 7106(a). AFGE II explains
how § 7106(b)(2) and (3) are narrowly defined by reference to interference with § 7106(a) reserved rights. By extension, § 7106(b)(1)
should be treated in the same way. The numbers, types, and grades of
employees assigned to an organizational subdivision and the methods
and means of performing work 229 should be narrowly defined to avoid
excessive interference with § 7106(a) reserved rights.
While ACT suffers from an overly broad declaration that
§ 7106(b) is an absolute exception to § 7106(a), 230 the court's blanket
statement is understandable considering the lack of commentary and
treatment by the FLRA and parties during the preceding administrative proceeding. As stated previously, the FLRA and agency conceded the uniform issue was both a § 7106(b)(1) subject as well as an
infringement on a § 7106(a) reserved right. 231 In a sense, the FLRA
and agency conceded too much. The ACT court therefore was faced
with a case analogous to a situation where an agency concedes that a
union proposal properly deals with a § 7106(b)(3) appropriate arrangement. If, from the outset, an agency agrees that a union proposal satisfies all the various tests for appropriate arrangements, the
agency has lost the argument and cannot claim nonnegotiability based
on a reserved right.232 Similarly, the ACT court was faced with the
FLRA and agency's concession that the uniform issue satisfied the
226. See American Fed'n Gov't Employees, Local 2782, 702 F.2d at 1187.
227. Cf id.
228. See id. at 1188.

229. See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1) (1994).
230. The court simply affirmed that § 7106(b) was "indisputably an exception to § 7106(a)."
Association of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter 29, 22 F.3d at 1155.
231. See id. at 1154.
232. Once a proposal has been properly classified as a § 7106(b)(3) appropriate arrangement, an agency must negotiate it, because appropriate arrangements are mandatory subjects of
bargaining in the federal sector. Cf. 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(3); discussion of appropriate arrangements supra pp. 851-53.
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definition of a means of performing work. 233 When one considers: (1)
the parties' concession and (2) prior case law holding uniforms are
means of performing work, 234 the court's ruling is not surprising.
V.

PROPOSED RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN

§ 7106(a)

AND

(b)(1)

Based on legislative history and judicial precedent, the proper relationship between § 7106(a) and (b) should be mutual exclusivity. As
such, the FLRA should classify a union proposal as constituting either
a management reserved right or a § 7106(b)(1) subject. However, the
FLRA must insure that it properly classifies a union proposal as either
a § 7106(a) reserved right or a § 7106(b)(1) subject. The various tests
developed by the FLRA are calibrated to determine whether a union
proposal deals with a general condition of employment or a specific
§ 7106(b)(1) subject.235 The FLRA needs to redesign the tests in or-

der to insure the union proposal really does not deal with a § 7106(a)
reserved right. For example, the FLRA could adopt an excessive interference test to avoid negotiations on subjects that primarily consist
of reserved rights. 236 The FLRA could use this test to determine, for
example, whether a proposal concerning the numbers of employees
233. Association of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter 29, 22 F.3d at 1154.
234. The ACT court outlined several cases from various federal circuits affirming that the
wearing of uniforms was a means of performing work within the meaning of § 7106(b)(1). See id.
However, the definitions devised by the FLRA to define a means of performing work are calibrated to differentiate between a § 7106(b)(1) permissive subject of bargaining and a general
condition of employment. Different tests and definitions could help determine whether an issue
is truly a § 7106(b)(1) subject or a § 7106(a) reserved right. See infra Part V.
235. Cf. Department Health & Human Serv., Indian Health Serv., Okla. City v. FLRA, 885
F.2d 911 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (affirming FLRA's decision that a union proposal for separate smoking
facilities did not infringe on a § 7106(b)(1) subject but rather was a negotiable condition of employment); Department Air Force, Scott Air Force Base, Ill., 33 F.L.R.A. 532, 542-43 (1988)
(changing an employee's tour of duty falls within the scope of permissive subjects under
§ 7106(b)(1) as opposed to a negotiable condition of employment); National Treasury Employees Union, 8 F.L.R.A. 3, 3-4 (1982) (holding that the wearing of uniforms is a means of performing work rather than a negotiable condition of employment).
All of the above cases utilized tests and definitions designed to differentiate between
mandatory negotiable conditions of employment and permissive subjects of bargaining. As such,
the tests and definitions classified a broad range of union proposals as permissive subjects in the
attempt to protect management's prerogative to only bargain at its discretion. After Executive
Order 12871, the danger arises of the FLRA utilizing these tests and definitions to test whether a
union proposal is either a permissive or prohibited subject. If the FLRA fails to recalibrate
these tests, a wide range of subjects will be declared permissive, and Executive Order 12871 will
force agencies to bargain them.
236. This approach would maintain consistency with past treatment of § 7106(b) by the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. See, e.g., American Fed'n
Gov't Employees, Local 2782 v. FLRA, 702 F.2d 1183, 1188 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (outlining Judge
Scalia's excessive interference test for appropriate arrangements); discussion supra Part I.C.
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really applies to an organizational subdivision 37 or whether a method
and means 238 narrowly applies to the performance of work.
Applying this approach to the uniform issue in ACT, the FLRA
and court first should have classified the uniform proposal under only
one subsection. Furthermore, they should not have restricted themselves to labeling the wearing of uniforms as a means of performing
work. 239 Instead, they should have recalibrated the test to differentiate between a means of performing work and a reserved management
right. The FLRA and court could have used an excessive interference
test to determine whether the failure to wear uniforms would have
excessively undermined the agency's ability to maintain security at the
military base. If the uniforms served primarily a security function 24o
instead of primarily as a tool to conduct manual labor around the military base, the FLRA and court should have declared the proposal a
prohibited subject of bargaining.
By adopting a mutual exclusivity framework with redesigned,
narrower definitions of § 7106(b)(1) subjects, the FLRA could also
reduce the possibility of an agency being forced to bargain over the
extreme proposals described in the two bargaining scenarios above.241
For example, Customs and FAA could avoid negotiating the firearms
and tour of duty proposals if the FLRA decided initially to classify the
proposals only as § 7106(a) or (b)(1) subjects of bargaining. In addition, bargaining the extreme union proposals would be avoided by
new tests for means of performing work and tours of duty that excluded those union proposals that excessively interfere with an
agency's budget or mission.
CONCLUSION

Before 1994, federal agencies enjoyed a broad range of nonnegotiable reserved rights contained in § 7106(a). 242 In 1993, Executive
Order 12871 required agencies to negotiate previously permissive subjects of bargaining contained in § 7106(b)(1). 243 The Executive Order
was not perceived'to change dramatically an agency's ability to refuse
237. See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(b)(1) (1994).
238. See id.
239. See Association of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter 29 v. FLRA, 22 F.3d 1150,
1154 (D.C. Cir. 1994).

240. See 5 U.S.C. § 7106(a)(1) (1994).
241. See supra Part IV.A.
242. See supra Part I.A.

243. Order 12,871, supra note 10, at 657, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 7101, at 1033-34.
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to negotiate § 7106(a) management rights. 244 However, ACT altered
the relationship between § 7106(a) and (b)(1) subjects of bargaining.
The ACT court declared § 7106(b)(1) subjects exceptions to § 7106(a)
reserved rights. 245 ACT in conjunction with Executive Order 12871
required an agency to negotiate a § 7106(b)(1) union proposal despite
even excessive interference with a § 7106(a) reserved right.2 4 The
FLRA subsequently adopted the view that § 7106(b)(1) was an excep247
tion to § 7106(a).
Both the FLRA and the ACT court failed to consider properly
the legislative history of the FSLMRS and prior decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
The legislative materials indicate Congress intended § 7106(a) and
§ 7106(b)(1) to be mutually exclusive. 248 Permissive § 7106(b)(1) subjects were not intended to encompass broad policy issues contained in
§ 7106(a). Furthermore, the ACT court failed to acknowledge its own
precedent that recognized negotiability limits on § 7106(b)(2) and (3)
subjects. 249 As a result, the FLRA and ACT court have provided federal sector unions with an opportunity to negotiate § 7106(a) reserved
rights that are couched in terms of § 7106(b)(1) subjects.
Nevertheless, the future relationship between § 7106(a) and (b) is
still uncertain despite the FLRA's adoption of the ACT rationale.
The analytical framework developed by the FLRA 250 can still be utilized to avoid the implications of ACT for § 7106(a). To accomplish
this, the FLRA needs to recalibrate its definitions of § 7106(b)(1) subjects 25 1 to incorporate some form of excessive interference theory sim-

ilar to the one utilized for appropriate arrangements.

252

While federal

244. See supra Part II.
245. Association of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter 29 v. FLRA, 22 F.3d 1150, 1155
(D.C. Cir. 1994).
246. See supra Part III.B.
247. National Ass'n Gov't Employees, Local R5-184, 51 F.L.R.A. 386, 392 (1995).
248. See supra Part IV.C.
249. See supra Part IV.D.
250. See NationalAss'n Gov't Employees, Local R5-184, 51 F.L.R.A. at 393.
251. However, in certain circumstances, even current definitions of § 7106(b)(1) subjects will
still bar unions from negotiating certain subjects. In a recent application of the FLRA's new
§ 7106(b)(1) procedure, a majority of the FLRA found that a union proposal, restricting an
agency from assigning more than 90 days of temporary duty assignments to employees, did not
constitute a § 7106(b)(1) subject. American Fed'n Gov't Employees Council of Locals No. 163,
51 F.L.R.A. No. 123 (July 3, 1996) (2-1 decision), 1996 WL 379495. The FLRA concluded the
union proposal did not fit the current definitions of the numbers, types and grades of employees.
Id. at *4 to *5. However, Member Wasserman's dissent illustrates the potential for misusing
current definitions to classify union proposals as § 7106(b)(1) subjects of bargaining instead of
§ 7106(a) reserved rights. Cf id. at *8 to *9.
252. See National Ass'n Gov't Employees, Local R14-87, 21 F.L.R.A. 24, 31-33 (1986).
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sector unions may not have yet gained a clear mandate to join agencies in formerly prohibited budget and mission determinations, future
FLRA decisions potentially could catapult these unions into a bargaining position reminiscent of their private sector counterparts.

